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INTRODUCTION 
Lincoln once asked, “[Is] it possible to lose the nation and 
yet preserve the Constitution?”  His rhetorical question 
called for a negative answer no less than its corollary: “Is it 
possible to lose the Constitution and yet preserve the 
Nation?”  Our Constitution and Nation are one.  Neither 
can exist without the other.  It is with this thought in mind 
that we should gauge the claims of those of those who 
assert that national security requires what our Constitution 
appears to condemn.1 
These words are as applicable today as they were when first 
uttered in 1962 by Former Chief Justice Earl Warren.  In a post-
September 11th world, the government is constantly using the 
threat of terrorism to justify abrogating Americans’ civil liberties, 
especially their First Amendment rights.2  In the military realm, the 
government is also limiting soldiers’ civil liberties, namely their 
First Amendment rights.  Many active-duty soldiers post military 
blogs (“milblogs”) from the front lines of the Iraq War, accessible 
to anyone with an Internet connection.  In an attempt to stem leaks 
 
 1 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 200 (1962) 
(citation omitted). 
 2 Paul Krugman, a columnist for the New York Times has noted that: 
[T]he Bush administration and the movement it leads have been engaged in an 
authoritarian project, an effort to remove all the checks and balances that have 
heretofore constrained the executive branch.  Much of this project involves the 
assertion of unprecedented executive authority—the right to imprison people 
indefinitely without charges (and torture them if the administration feels like 
it), the right to wiretap American citizens without court authorization, the right 
to declare, when signing laws passed by Congress, that the laws don’t really 
mean what they say.  But an almost equally important aspect of the project has 
been the attempt to create a political environment in which nobody dares to 
criticize the administration or reveal inconvenient facts about its actions. 
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, The Treason Card, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at A6. 
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of what it sees as information helpful to the enemy, the Department 
of Defense has promulgated a regulation requiring milbloggers to 
register their websites with commanders, limiting what 
milbloggers can post on their sites, and punishing authors who leak 
sensitive information.3 
Typically, courts recognize that First Amendment rights are 
crucial to promoting public discourse in a democratic society.4  As 
such, the Supreme Court typically gives speech a high degree of 
protection, reviewing regulations limiting First Amendment rights 
through a lens of strict scrutiny.5  However, the military is an 
exception to this jurisprudence.6  In that context, the Court usually 
defers to the military’s judgment on what degree of censorship is 
necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the armed forces and 
promote national security.7  However, the Court’s justification for 
these differing degrees of review is unconvincing when applied to 
milblogs.  The question then becomes: Where should the balance 
between national security and soldiers’ free speech rights lie? 
This Note argues that the balance should lie where it does in 
the civilian realm: through a lens of strict scrutiny.  Part I 
chronicles the rise and popularity of milblogs. Part I also addresses 
the Department of Defense’s authority to promulgate milblogging 
regulations, and introduces the Department of Defense’s 
milblogging regulation.  Part I also examines the military’s 
enforcement of the Department of Defense’s regulation by 
discussing three servicemen who have been punished for 
milblogging.  Part II compares how civilian courts treat the First 
Amendment rights implicated by milblogs with military First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Part III argues that milblogs serve 
important societal interests and that courts’ traditional justification 
for a different standard of First Amendment review in the military 
does not apply to milblogs.  Part III also argues that the 
Department of Defense’s milblogging regulation is either (i) a de 
 
 3 See infra Part I.B. 
 4 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105 (1991). 
 5 See, e.g., id. 
 6 See infra Part II.B. 
 7 See infra Part II.B. 
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facto prior restraint that should be viewed by courts as 
presumptively unconstitutional; or, (ii) a regulation restricting 
soldiers’ First Amendment rights that should be viewed by courts 
through a lens of strict scrutiny because true national security 
concerns will survive strict scrutiny while pretextual viewpoint 
discrimination will not.  This Note concludes by reiterating the 
importance of the First Amendment and the need for stringent 
judicial review of regulations designed to limit soldiers’ First 
Amendment rights. 
I. THE MILBLOGGING QUANDARY:  
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S ATTEMPTS TO  
REGULATE A NEW FORM OF COMMUNICATION 
The ability of active-duty soldiers to post milblogs from the 
front lines of the Iraq Conflict, accessible to anyone with an 
Internet connection, has given the armed forces new operational 
security problems.8  In an attempt to stem leaks of what it sees as 
information helpful to the enemy, military leaders have 
promulgated regulations censoring milblogs and punishing authors 
who leak sensitive information.9  This section describes the 
quandary milblogs pose to operational security by giving a brief 
overview and description of milblogs, an explanation of the 
Department of Defense’s attempts to regulate this new form of 
communication, and an explanation of the Department of 
Defense’s statutory authority to promulgate such restrictions on 
communication. 
A. The Rise of Milblogging 
The term “milblog” is short for “military blogs,” which are 
“online journals run by active duty military or reservists who have 
returned to civilian life.”10  Milbloggers include “a core group of 
about 100 regulars and hundreds more loosely organized activists, 
angry contrarians . . . self-appointed pundits, and would-be 
 
 8 See infra Part I.B. 
 9 See infra Part I.B. 
 10 Hugh Hewitt, Rise of the Milblogs, DAILY STANDARD, Mar. 12, 2004, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/840fvgmo.asp. 
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poets.”11  According to The Mudville Gazette,12 a website devoted 
to information on military blogging administered by an Army 
veteran who goes by the screen name Greyhawk, “only about a 
dozen [milblogs] were in existence two years ago when the U.S. 
invaded Iraq.”13  Today, as many as 200 active-duty soldiers keep 
blogs,14 with a leading milblog search engine identifying “over 
1,100 blogs from 24 [nations] by country, branch of service, 
gender and popularity.”15  Milblogs are thus becoming an 
increasingly-popular way for civilians to “‘listen in’ on the war 
zone.”16 
Although some milbloggers identify themselves on their 
websites,17 other authors choose to remain anonymous, known 
only by a pen name.18  Whether anonymous or not, “[s]oldier 
bloggers encompass most ranks, jobs and locations.”19  These 
soldiers are “writing from Iraqi Internet cafés, barracks and 
anywhere else a soldier can log on to the Web.”20  Some of their 
writings “feature practical news, photographs and advice.”21  Other 
milblogs “are openly political,” some questioning the war and 
 
 11 John Hockenberry, The Blogs of War, WIRED, Aug. 2005, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/milblogs.html. 
 12 http://www.mudvillegazette.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
 13 Jonathan Finer, The New Ernie Pyles: Sgtlizzie and 67cshdocs, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 12, 2005, at A01. There are also many milblogs authored by soldiers not stationed 
in Iraq. See Millblogging.com, http://www.milblogging.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).  
However, since the Department of Defense regulations discussed below deal only with 
Iraq milblogs, non-Iraq milblogs and the regulations governing them are outside the 
scope of this Note. 
 14 Finer, supra note 13. 
 15 Milblogging.com Joins Forces with Military.com; Leading Military Website Adds 
World’s Largest Military Blog Portal to Accelerate Spread of Soldier-Journalism, 
BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 18, 2006. 
 16 The Blogs of War, ARMY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, available at 
http:/www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-674310.php. 
 17 See http://www.milblogging.com for a list of anonymous and non-anonymous 
milblogs. 
 18 See, e.g., THE MUDVILLE GAZETTE, http://www.mudvillegazette.com (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2006) (identifying its author only as Greyhawk).  Greyhawk is also credited with 
“coining the term milblogger shortly after he started [The Mudville Gazette] in March 
2003.” Hockenberry, supra note 11 (emphasis in original). 
 19 The Blogs of War, supra note 16. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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some cheering it.22  Some milbloggers view their sites as “a 
rebellion against mainstream media, which, they say, leave out of 
their newscasts and publications important stories about the war.”23  
Many other milbloggers say they started their blogs to keep friends 
and family members updated on what they are doing while 
stationed overseas.24  Given this diversity of authorship and 
purpose, the only common characteristics of milblogs are their 
“casual, sometimes profane language”25 and their ability to “give 
readers an unfiltered perspective on combat largely unavailable 
elsewhere.”26 
B. Balancing Operational Security with Civil Rights: The 
Department of Defense’s Campaign to Restrict Milblogging 
As blogging becomes more popular among soldiers, the 
Department of Defense (“DOD”) has grown increasingly 
concerned that soldiers may be inadvertently posting information 
that could endanger troops embedded in war zones like Iraq.  As 
such, the DOD has enacted restrictions on the type of information 
soldiers can and cannot post on the internet, as well as a 
 
 22 Id.  For example, a blog written by National Guard Spec. Leonard Clark noted that 
“[a] growing number of [soldiers in Iraq] are starting to wonder why we should continue 
to risk our lives for this whole mess when we know that the government will probably 
pull out of here.” Finer, supra note 13.  Clark was fined $1,640 and demoted to private 
first class in July of 2005 for “posting what the military said was classified material on 
his blog.” Id. 
 23 The Blogs of War, supra note 16.  For example, a blog written by Sgt. Elizabeth Le 
Bel, known online as Sgtlizzie, described in harrowing detail her Humvee’s encounter 
with a roadside bomb: 
I started to scream bloody murder, and one of the other females on the convoy 
came over, grabbed my hand and started to calm me down.  She held on to me, 
allowing me to place my leg on her shoulder as it was hanging free. . . . I 
thought that my face had been blown off, so I made the remark that I wouldn’t 
be pretty again. . . . Of course the medics all rushed with reassurance which 
was quite amusing as I know what I look like now and I don’t even want to 
think about what I looked like then. 
Finer, supra note 13.  However, “[t]he Army [only] released a three-sentence statement 
about the incident in which her driver, a fellow soldier, was killed.” Id. 
 24 Finer, supra note 13. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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registration requirement for all milblogs operated by soldiers 
stationed in Iraq.27 
1. The Department of Defense’s Authority to Promulgate 
Milblogging Regulations 
The DOD’s authority to promulgate restrictions on milblogging 
stems from Article I, sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives 
Congress “the power to raise and support armies; provide and 
maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining 
them.”28  The Constitution also makes the President Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and, when called 
to Federal service, Commander in Chief of various state militias.29  
Based on “his powers as Commander in Chief, the President has 
the power to promulgate Executive orders and service regulations 
to govern the Armed Forces as long as they do not conflict with 
any basic constitutional or statutory provisions.”30  Both “[t]he 
President and Congress have authorized the Service secretaries and 
military commanders to . . . promulgate [the] orders and 
regulations” needed to maintain order and discipline in the armed 
forces.31  Pursuant to this grant of power by the President 
 
 27 Memorandum from Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, MNC-I Policy #9 Unit and Soldier 
Owned and Maintained Websites (Feb. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Vines Memorandum], 
available at http://www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlDC/original/iraqblogrules.pdf. 
 28 Estela I. Velez Pollack, Military Courts-Martial: An Overview, Cong. Research 
Service, May 26, 2004, www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21850.  Using this authority, Congress 
has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–
941 (2006), to govern soldiers’ discipline and punishment. Id. 
 29 Rod Powers, Military Justice 101, About.com, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/ 
justicelawlegislation/a/miljustice_3.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.  “Our courts have consistently held that military regulations have the force and 
effect of the law if they are consistent with the Constitution or statutes.” Id.; see also 
infra Part II.B.  “Regulations and orders issued at lower levels of command are 
enforceable by Article 92 [of the] UCMJ, [10 U.S.C. § 892,] which prescribes violations 
of general orders and regulations, and Articles 90, [10 U.S.C. § 890,] and 91, [10 U.S.C. 
§ 891, of the] UCMJ, which prohibit disobedience of the commands of superiors.” 
Powers, supra note 29.  Military offenses are tried via either Special or General Courts-
Martial, the trial level of the military court system. Pollack, supra note 28.  Convictions 
can then be appealed to a military Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.  “If the conviction is 
affirmed . . . the appellant may request review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces [CAAF], and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.” Id.  Review by the CAAF and 
Supreme Court is discretionary and is usually how the constitutionality of military 
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and Congress, the DOD issues directives to “establish or describe 
policy, programs, and organizations; define missions; provide 
authority; and assign responsibilities.”32  Specifically, DOD 
Directives are “broad policy document[s] containing what is 
required by legislation, the President, or the Secretary of Defense 
to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or conduct by the DOD 
Components within their specific areas of responsibilities.”33  
DOD Directives thus govern all branches of the armed forces and 
are given the force of law via the UCMJ and the Department of 
Defense’s grant of power from the Legislative and Executive 
branches of government. 
2. The Department of Defense’s Blogging Regulations 
In its power as armed forces regulator, the Department of 
Defense has begun to crack down on what it sees as operational 
security (“OpSec”) risks that have increased with the popularity of 
milblogs.  In an August 5, 2004 memorandum to all Army Leaders, 
Army Chief of Staff Peter A. Schoomaker noted that “some 
soldiers continue to post sensitive information to internet websites 
and blogs, e.g., photos depicting system vulnerabilities and tactics, 
techniques and procedures.”34  Schoomaker cautioned that “such 
OpSec violations needlessly place lives at risk and degrade the 
effectiveness of [the Army’s] operations.”35  Schoomaker further 
warned that putting such information on the Internet is dangerous 
because the enemy aggressively reads and exploits such 
 
regulations is decided. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.  So, unlike most other administrative 
agencies, whose decisions are reviewed through the normal federal court system, military 
law is reviewed by military-run courts until an appeal reaches the Supreme Court. 
 32 Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, What are the DoD 
Issuances?, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/general.html (last visited Oct. 
10, 2006). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Memorandum from Gen. Peter A. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, to Army 
Leaders (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/08/usa0805.html 
[hereinafter Schoomaker Memorandum]; see also Memorandum from Gen. Richard A. 
Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff, to Army Leaders (Feb. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/08/usa0805.html [hereinafter Cody Memorandum] 
(noting that sensitive information, such as “annotated photos of an Abrams tank[’s 
vulnerabilities] are easily found on the internet”). 
 35 Schoomaker Memorandum, supra note 34. 
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information.36  Schoomaker’s memorandum also referred back to 
an earlier memorandum from Gen. Richard A. Cody, Army Vice 
Chief of Staff, admonishing army leaders to “protect information 
that may have a negative impact on foreign relations with coalition 
allies or world opinion.”37 
Schoomaker’s memorandum was just a precursor to tighter 
restrictions on milblogging.  On April 6, 2005 Lieutenant General 
John R. Vines issued Policy Memorandum #9, entitled “Unit and 
Soldier Owned and Maintained Websites” to members of the 
Multi-National Corps stationed in Iraq.38  This policy now requires 
“all soldiers in Iraq [to] register their Web logs with their [unit] 
commanders”39 by providing their unit, location, webmaster name, 
telephone number and IP address of their blog or website.40  Unit 
commanders, in turn, are required to monitor their subordinates’ 
websites “on a quarterly basis” to ensure that no prohibited 
material has been posted.41  Prohibited material includes classified 
information, the names of service members killed or wounded in 
action before their families are notified, and accounts of incidents 
still under investigation.42  Milbloggers also “must clear photos 
through their unit public affairs representative.”43  While 
individual posts need not be cleared ahead of time, it is an 
 
 36 See id. 
 37 Cody Memorandum, supra note 34. 
 38 Vines Memorandum, supra note 27. 
 39 Kelly Kennedy, Blog Brother: Army Eyes What Troops Post; Soldiers Cited for 
Good, Bad Security Practices, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at 31; see also Finer, 
supra note 13 (noting that this policy, promulgated by Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, the top 
tactical commander in Iraq, was “the military’s first policy memorandum on Web sites 
maintained by soldiers”). 
 40 Vines Memorandum, supra note 27. These regulations apply to both official military 
websites (those with a .mil address or those sponsored by military command) and 
unofficial ones (soldiers’ personal websites and blogs). Id.  While individual posts do not 
need to be cleared ahead of time, it is a soldier’s responsibility to ensure that what he is 
posting to the Internet is permissible. Id. 
 41 Id.; see also The Blogs of War, supra note 16 (quoting Capt. Chris Karns, a 
spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan). 
 42 Finer, supra note 13 (quoting Lt. Col. Steven Boylan, a military spokesman in 
Baghdad who defends the regulations as “nearly identical to those required of news 
organizations that cover the military”); see id. 
 43 Kennedy, supra note 39. 
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individual soldier’s responsibility to ensure that his website 
complies with these guidelines.44  Vines’ policy memorandum 
notes generally that “risks of the release of information must be 
weighed against the benefits of publishing to the Internet.”45  To 
make soldiers’ assessments of this balance a bit easier, the Army 
has created a website with examples of milblogs that meet these 
regulations, and examples of those that do not.46  Finally, Vines’ 
memorandum notes that bloggers or website owners who publish 
prohibited information will be instructed by the Army Web Risk 
Assessment Cell (AWRAC) to close their website or link until the 
offending information has been removed.47  Additionally, Vines’ 
memorandum warns that violators “may be subject to adverse 
administrative action or punishment.”48 
3. Enforcement: The Blogs of Private Leonard Clark, Army 
Reservist Jason Hartley, and Major Michael Cohen 
The Department of Defense’s new website regulations have 
been enforced by “targeting bloggers with warnings, punctuated by 
high-profile disciplinary action.”49  For example, Pfc. Leonard 
Clark, an Arizona national guardsman serving in Iraq, was 
demoted in rank and fined $1,640 in August, 2005, for putting 
classified information on his blog.50  Another soldier, Army 
National Guard Spec. Jason Hartley, was also demoted in rank and 
fined $1,000.51  The Army claimed Hartley should not have posted 
information about his unit’s flight route in Iraq, because it could 
help the enemy shoot down U.S. aircraft, or information about his 
rifle reloading pattern because it could help the enemy time an 
attack.52  Major Michael Cohen, a doctor on duty at the Forward 
Operating Base in Mosul, Iraq, was ordered to shut down his 
 
 44 Vines Memorandum, supra note 27. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. para. 6d. 
 48 Id. para. 6h. 
 49 Joseph Mallia, Soldiers’ Blogs U.S. Cracks Down: Tangled in the Web, NEWSDAY, 
Jan. 2, 2006, at A04. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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milblog after he reported in graphic detail on the casualties he 
treated after the December 21, 2004, suicide bombing in Mosul 
that killed 22 people.53 
The cases of Clark, Hartley and Cohen illustrate the point that 
“[n]owadays, milbloggers ‘get shut down almost as fast as they’re 
set up[.]’”54  As the armed services struggle to adopt policies to 
police milblogs, the question becomes in an unpopular war fighting 
a nebulous enemy, how much power should the armed services 
have to silence the voices of front-line soldiers, not all of whom 
have a positive view of the war?  While this issue has certainly 
arisen before, most notably during the Vietnam War, the stakes are 
even higher in the milblogging context because of the potential for 
the Internet to amplify one soldier’s voice.  In other words, 
shutting down one milblog may mean depriving thousands of 
civilians of a valuable source of information not only about the 
war, but what it really means to fight for your country.  However, 
it is also extremely important to keep our soldiers safe by 
prohibiting disclosure of information that could be used to harm 
them. 
This dilemma created by milblogs brings up obvious First 
Amendment issues.  It is thus useful to examine the First 
Amendment both in a civilian context and as it is usually applied to 
the armed forces. 
II. LIMITS ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  
CIVILIAN SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE COMPARED TO  
MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations 
implicate a number of core First Amendment issues, including 
freedom of speech, prior restraints, and the public’s right to 
know.55  It is thus useful to examine how these issues are dealt 
 
 53 Finer, supra note 13; see also The Blogs of War, supra note 16. 
 54 Mallia, supra note 49 (quoting New York Army National Guard Spc. Jason Hartley). 
 55 Ancillary First Amendment issues implicated by milblogs, including whether 
bloggers are journalists and whether the Internet can be considered a public forum, are 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
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with in civilian courts, and compare the civilian treatment of the 
First Amendment with its treatment in a military context. 
A. Civilian First Amendment Jurisprudence 
1. Freedom of Speech 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”56  Throughout history, 
“the United States Supreme Court has consistently evidenced its 
willingness to staunchly protect the right to free speech” in the 
civilian realm.57  However, “although the First Amendment 
appears to speak in absolutist terms” about the right to free speech, 
the Court has never adopted a literal approach to dealing with First 
Amendment issues.58  Instead, “[t]he Court has adopted a view that 
seeks to strike a balance between individual rights and the good of 
the community.”59  Courts “often take into account a variety of 
factors, such as the content of the speech, the context in which it 
was expressed, the type of restraint being employed, and the nature 
of the harm that the restraint is intended to prevent or punish.”60  In 
First Amendment cases, this balance “favors the side of speech, so 
that the competing interest must be not merely weightier, but 
weightier in some specified degree.”61  The result is that “a 
restriction on speech may be unconstitutional, even though the 
interest the restriction serves is legitimate and even perhaps 
weightier than the competing speech interest[.]”62  The balancing 
tests courts use to determine which is weightier, free speech 
interests or the state’s regulatory interests, are known generally as 
“levels of scrutiny.”63  Although courts give inconsistent labels to 
 
 56 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 57 Rafic H. Barrage, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: First Amendment Free 
Speech Guarantee Extended to the Internet, 49 MERCER L. REV. 625, 627–28 (1998). 
 58 Id. at 628. But see Edmund Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: 
A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 554 (1962) (quoting Justice Black’s opinion 
that the First Amendment “says ‘no law,’ and that is what I believe it means”). 
 59 Barrage, supra note 57, at 628. 
 60 MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 28 (7th ed. 2005). 
 61 Id. at 30–31. 
 62 Id. at 31. 
 63 Id. 
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the methods they use to determine this balance, “three broad 
‘levels of scrutiny’ have emerged”: strict, intermediate, and 
rational basis scrutiny.64 
Strict scrutiny requires the State to “show that its regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end.”65  In other words, the State must 
articulate an interest “of compelling importance that it cannot 
achieve” without the regulation.66  Strict scrutiny “is applied to 
most ‘discriminatory restrictions or prohibitions on speech.’”67  
Intermediate scrutiny is a step down from strict scrutiny and only 
requires the State to show that the regulation is “closely related to 
an ‘important,’ ‘significant,’ or ‘substantial’ government 
interest.”68  Courts often use intermediate scrutiny to “evaluate 
regulations that affect expression but are not targeted at expression, 
target only ‘low-value’ expression, or do not discriminate among 
types of expression.”69  Courts also use intermediate scrutiny to 
evaluate “time, place and manner” regulations, holding that 
“[r]egulations of the time, place and manner of expression are 
constitutional if they . . . ‘are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.’”70  Rational basis scrutiny, the least 
restrictive scrutiny applied by courts, requires that State 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); see also id. 
 66 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 598 
(1983); see also FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 31. 
 67 FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 31; see also Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 
236 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68 FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 31. 
 69 Id.  For example, the Court has noted that: 
[w]hen speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, government regulation of that conduct is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest. 
Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 70 Id. at 32 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
44 (1983)). 
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regulations bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental purpose to be constitutional.71  “Rational basis 
scrutiny is rarely applied when First Amendment interests are at 
stake[;]” therefore, speech regulations are governed only by the 
strict and intermediate levels of scrutiny.72 
2. Prior Restraints 
The concept of prior restraints on speech refers to 
governmental restrictions on or censorship of speech before 
publication.73  Since the invention of the printing press, 
governments have tried to control its use.74  In England, the 
government prohibited “printers from publishing works that had 
not been licensed by government officials, who could censor 
objectionable passages or deny a license altogether.”75  However, 
“[e]ven before the First Amendment was adopted it was 
understood in both England and America that ‘prior restraints’ 
were inconsistent with freedom of speech.”76  “[H]istorical 
evidence suggests that the framers saw that a free press would be 
essential to their vision of democracy and understood that it would 
have to mean more than freedom from prior restraint.”77  
Therefore, prior restraints are treated by courts as being 
presumptively unconstitutional.78  In the Pentagon Papers case, 
New York Times Co. v. United States,79 the government attempted 
to overcome this presumption by showing that a Department of 
Justice injunction against publication of the papers at issue was 
justified because publication would endanger national security.  In 
a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court noted that the 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 96–97 (noting the difficulty of defining “prior restraint” with any degree of 
precision). 
 74 Id. at 89. 
 75 Id.  This licensing requirement “was codified by Parliament in a series of acts 
making it a criminal offense to print a work without a license[.]” Id. 
 76 Id. at 89–90 (quoting William Blackstone’s opinion that “[t]he liberty of the press is 
indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous 
restraints on publications”). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 79 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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government had not met its “heavy burden of showing justification 
for the imposition of such a restraint.”80 
In contrast, one of the few cases upholding a prior restraint on 
the press in the interest of national security, United States v. 
Progressive, Inc.,81 involved an injunction under the Atomic 
Energy Act82 prohibiting The Progressive magazine from 
publishing an article entitled “The H Bomb Secret: How We Got 
It, Why We’re Telling It.”83  The magazine contended that its 
article was merely a compendium of information already in the 
public domain.84  The government argued that much of the 
information was not in the public domain and that even if the 
information was publicly available, publication of the compendium 
in an easily-accessible format could “help enemies who otherwise 
would not put all the pieces together.”85  The court held that 
“publication of the technical information on the hydrogen bomb 
contained in the article is analogous to publication of troop 
movements or locations in time of war and falls within the 
extremely narrow exception to the rule against prior restraint.”86  
Although Progressive “is a product of the Cold War era, it is easy 
to transpose its security concerns” to the current post-September 
11th climate.87 
3. The Public’s Right to Know 
The public’s right to be informed about government activities 
was part of the founding rhetoric of the United States.88  James 
 
 80 Id. at 714 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
 81 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
 82 42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et. seq. (2003). 
 83 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990. 
 84 Id. 
 85 FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 101. 
 86 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996. 
 87 FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 102 (noting that “it is easy to imagine terrorists 
using information about weaknesses in our critical infrastructure . . . or information about 
chemical or biological weapons materials to harm . . . Americans” and further noting that 
governmental officials “essentially ‘classified’ the Ph.D dissertation of a George Mason 
University graduate student for security reasons”). 
 88 See Malla Pollack, Article, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at 
the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First 
Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 67 (1999) (citing Letter from James 
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Madison noted that “knowledge will forever govern ignorance” 
and “[a] popular government without popular information []or the 
means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or 
perhaps both.”89  Today, “[t]he public’s right to know is the 
philosophical basis of many statutes that force government entities 
to provide documents on request or to allow the public into 
meetings.”90  However, there is no specific “right to know” 
enumerated in the United States Constitution.91  Some First 
Amendment theorists argue that the right to know can be created 
out of the First Amendment rights “to hear the views of others and 
to listen to their version of the facts,” “the right to inquire,” and “to 
a degree, the right of access to information.”92  However, others 
“‘read the Press Clause of the First Amendment to assure merely 
the existence of the free press as an institution[.]’”93  Justice Potter 
Stewart has noted that “[t]he press is free to do battle against 
secrecy and deception in government[,] [b]ut the press cannot 
expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed . . . 
[t]he Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act 
nor an Official Secrets Act.”94  Moreover, “[s]ome scholars find 
the concept of a ‘right to know’ absurd because it implies that 
government has a positive duty to keep the public informed[,]” 
even though “[n]egative rights, . . . like the public’s possible right 
not to have the government block access to information, are 
common in the Constitution.”95 
One notable case where the public’s right to know was invoked 
regarding military operations is Flynt v. Rumsfeld.96  In Flynt, the 
 
Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), in James Madison, The Complete Madison 337 
(Saul K. Padover ed., 1953)). 
 89 Id. at 67. 
 90 Id. at 70 (citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552–59, as an example).  
However, it is recognized that “[g]iving citizens unfettered access to government 
documents and processes . . . threatens other important values, such as privacy, national 
security, and administrative efficiency.” FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 603. 
 91 See Pollack, supra note 88, at 73. 
 92 Id. at 70–71, n.116 (quoting Thomas I. Emerson and noting several cases in which he 
made similar statements). 
 93 Id. at 73. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 73–74. 
 96 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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publisher of Hustler magazine sought permission to accompany 
ground troops on combat missions in Afghanistan.97  Although 
journalists had access to the fighting in Afghanistan via a pool 
system,98 Flynt sought the “right to travel with military units into 
combat, with all of the accommodations and protections that 
entails[.]”99  In support of this request, Flynt argued that “the 
military is obligated to accommodate the press because the press is 
what informs the electorate as to what our government is doing at 
war.”100  However, the court felt differently, holding that “there is 
no constitutionally based right for the media to embed with U.S. 
military forces in combat[.]”101  Flynt is thus an example of the 
skepticism with which courts regard arguments involving the 
public’s right to know.  Although the public may have a right to be 
informed about military operations, this right was not enough to 
trump the military’s right to control access by the press.102 
B. The Military’s Unique First Amendment Jurisprudence 
Courts treat First Amendment claims with a higher degree of 
skepticism in the military context than the civilian context.  From 
the beginning of American history, military servicemembers have 
had limited First Amendment rights.103  “Persuasive scholarship 
has indicated that the founding fathers envisioned a limited, if not 
non-existent, role for the First Amendment in the armed 
services.”104  These limited rights were a logical extension of 
America’s early sedition laws, since “drafters who supported 
doctrines of seditious libel in the civilian sphere [did not want to 
 
 97 See id. at 699. 
 98 The pool system of military journalism was created in conjunction with the Persian 
Gulf War. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 643.  Under this system, “media 
organizations chosen by the [Defense] Department were allowed to select specific 
reporters to be transported to cover the early stages of military operations.” Id.  “These 
reporters would then ‘pool’ their information, sharing it with other reporters who had not 
been selected.” Id. 
 99 Flynt, 355 F.3d at 702 (emphasis in original). 
 100 Id. (emphasis and internal quotations omitted). 
 101 Id. at 706. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See Donald N. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 
423, 429 (1977). 
 104 Id. 
DENBLEYKER_GALLEYPROOF_120706.DOC 1/23/2007  4:37 PM 
2007 FIRST AMENDMENT AND MILBLOGGING 419 
protect similarly] disruptive speech by men in uniform.”105  The 
view that the First Amendment was inapplicable to the military 
prevailed throughout the eighteen- and nineteen-hundreds.106  As 
such, “[s]erious consideration of military First Amendment rights 
did not begin until the post-World War II era.”107  By this time, the 
armed forces had evolved into a “vastly different [organization] 
from that of the 1790s or 1880s[.]”108  Increasingly sophisticated 
warfare had led to a broadening of soldiers’ duties, thus requiring 
an “increase in the level and diversity of education among men and 
women in uniform.”109  Additionally, “[t]he subtleties of the Cold 
War, nuclear weapons, and the emergence of third world 
powers . . . ended easy distinctions between military and political 
matters.”110  The burgeoning military-industrial complex thus 
served to convince constitutional scholars that First Amendment 
rights were a “relevant concern in the military[.]”111 
Although scholars first recognized the importance of the First 
Amendment to the military in the 1950s, unsurprisingly, most of 
the military’s modern First Amendment jurisprudence was shaped 
during the Vietnam War era.112  Because the Vietnam War was 
unpopular among both civilians and many judges, “by 1974 federal 
courts had developed a willingness to review a variety of military 
actions on both procedural and substantive grounds.”113  First 
Amendment cases arising during this era demonstrate that “courts 
recognized that the military could not deny substantive 
constitutional rights ipse dixit, solely because the military is the 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. at 429–430. 
 107 Id.; see also Edward F. Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen’s First 
Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 330 (1971) (noting that “although substantial 
numbers of servicemen were court-martialed for speech which was critical of the 
President during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, First 
Amendment issues were rarely raised and never found to constitute a bar to prosecution 
or conviction”). 
 108 Zillman, supra note 103, at 430. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See generally Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Constitutional Rights 
and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 396 
(1976). 
 113 Id. at 401. 
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military.”114  However, as one of these cases, United States v. 
Priest,115 demonstrates, the courts’ review of First Amendment 
issues was highly deferential to the military’s authority to 
promulgate rules promoting order and discipline.  While 
servicemembers had First Amendment rights, their rights were 
subject to many more restrictions than those of civilians.116  This 
deferential review of policies restricting servicemen’s First 
Amendment rights was adopted by the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Glines,117 and continues to this day. 
It is thus useful to examine both Priest and Glines to determine 
what standard of review the Court would be likely to employ 
should it have occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the 
military’s current restrictions on blogging. 
1. United States v. Priest 
United States v. Priest involved charges against a serviceman 
who, while on active duty in the Navy, edited, published and 
distributed an on-base underground newspaper entitled “OM.”118  
The purpose of OM was to protest the United States’ involvement 
in Vietnam and, more generally, to speak out against the military 
establishment.119  As such, issues of OM contained antiwar poems, 
quotations attributed to well-known antiwar advocates, and explicit 
instructions on how servicemen could desert the armed forces by 
going to Canada.120  One issue also contained a quasi-violent 
antiwar sentiment, suggesting “the velocity with which the Vice 
President would strike the pavement if he was pushed or fell from 
the Empire State Building.”121  The Priest court noted that these 
words established the accused’s “abandonment of change by 
constitutional means and adoption of violence as the method by 
which his viewpoint is to be imposed on the United States.”122 
 
 114 Id. 
 115 21 C.M.A. 564 (1972). 
 116 See, e.g., id. at 570. 
 117 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
 118 Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 566. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. at 566–67. 
 121 Id. at 567. 
 122 Id. at 568–69. 
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Ultimately, the court upheld Priest’s punishment.123  In doing 
so, the court recognized its duty to strike a “proper balance . . . 
between the essential needs of the armed services and the right to 
speak out as a free American.”124  The court emphasized that while 
“First Amendment rights of civilians and members of the armed 
forces are not necessarily coextensive . . . our national reluctance 
to inhibit free expression dictates that the connection between the 
statements or publications involved and their effect on military 
discipline be closely examined.”125  Despite these words, the court 
concluded that Priest’s newspaper was improperly questioning 
authority because the role of a soldier is “to execute orders, not to 
debate the wisdom of decisions that the Constitution entrusts to the 
legislative and judicial branches of the Government and to the 
Commander-in-Chief.”126 
The Priest court also noted that “[i]n the armed forces some 
restrictions exist for reasons that have no counterpart in the civilian 
community.”127  For example, disrespectful or contemptuous 
speech that may be tolerated in the civilian context is often 
constitutionally unprotected in the military community because it 
“may . . . undermine the effectiveness of response to command.”128  
The Priest court concluded that the military was well within its 
authority to punish a single serviceman for publishing his criticism 
of the armed forces because such words could lead to larger dissent 
within the troops.129  This rationale also underpins the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Glines.130 
2. Brown v. Glines 
Decided eight years after Priest, Brown v. Glines involved 
challenges to a United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) regulation 
“requir[ing] members of the service to obtain approval from their 
 
 123 Id. at 573. 
 124 Id. at 570. 
 125 Id. at 569–70. 
 126 Id. at 571. 
 127 Id. at 570. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. at 569–71. 
 130 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
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commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases.”131  
Captain Glines, while on active duty at Travis Air Force Base in 
California, “drafted petitions to several Members of Congress and 
to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air Force’s 
grooming standards.”132  Because Glines knew he needed 
command approval to solicit signatures within the base, he first 
circulated the petitions off-base.133  However, during a training 
flight at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, Glines violated the 
U.S.A.F. regulation by giving “the petitions to an Air Force 
sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander.”134  
A majority of the Supreme Court voted to uphold the U.S.A.F. 
regulation under which Glines was punished.135 
a) The Glines majority 
As in Priest, the Glines majority concluded that “while 
members of the military services are entitled to the protections of 
the First Amendment, ‘the different character of the military 
community and of the military mission requires a different 
application of those protections.’”136  Servicemembers’ rights 
must, therefore, “yield somewhat to meet certain overriding 
demands of discipline and duty” to ensure that “[m]ilitary 
personnel [are] ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion 
arises.”137  The Glines majority thus recognized that “[l]oyalty, 
morale and discipline are essential attributes of all military 
service.”138  “Combat service obviously requires [these attributes,] 
[a]nd members of the Armed Services, wherever they are assigned, 
may be transferred to combat duty or called to deal with civil 
disorder or natural disaster.”139  The Glines majority thus 
concluded that because the U.S.A.F. petition regulation was a prior 
approval requirement that supported commanders’ authority to 
 
 131 Id. at 349. 
 132 Id. at 351. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 361. 
 136 Id. at 354 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)). 
 137 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974)). 
 138 Id. at 356 n.14. 
 139 Id. 
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maintain basic discipline on base, it “did not offend the First 
Amendment.”140 
b) Justice Brennan’s Dissent 
Although the Glines majority felt that high deference was due 
the military in this context, Justice Brennan’s dissent argued that 
the majority was upholding a U.S.A.F. regulation that had 
established “an essentially discretionary regime of censorship that 
arbitrarily deprives [servicemembers] of precious communicative 
rights.”141  Justice Brennan noted that the circulation of petitions 
“is indisputably protected First Amendment activity” that 
implicates a number of related rights: “the right to express 
ideas, . . . the right to be exposed to ideas expressed by others, . . . 
the right to communicate with government, . . . and the right to 
associate with others in the expression of opinion.”142  The 
U.S.A.F. regulation, in Justice Brennan’s view, was an improper 
prior restraint on these rights because such restraints could only be 
exercised to “avert[] a virtually certain prospect of imminent, 
severe injury to the Nation in time of war.”143 
Furthermore, Justice Brennan felt that the command-approval 
procedure for petition circulation was “seriously flawed.”144  
Justice Brennan emphasized that “restraints upon communication 
must be hedged about by procedures that guarantee against 
infringement of protected expression and that eliminate the play of 
discretion that epitomizes arbitrary censorship.”145  However, no 
such safeguards were in place for those denied the opportunity to 
petition under the U.S.A.F. regulation at issue in Glines.146  There 
was also some evidence of viewpoint discrimination in Glines 
since two of the respondents individually submitted a single leaflet 
for approval by their base commander, who denied one of the two 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 362–63 (internal citations omitted). 
 143 Id. at 364. The activity at issue in Brown occurred during the late 1970s, which was 
not a time of war for the United States. 
 144 Id. at 366. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See id. 
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requests because of the petition’s “disrespectful and 
‘contemptuous’ tone.”147 
Justice Brennan further noted that the U.S.A.F. regulation was 
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.148  
Assuming the majority correctly concluded that maintenance of 
military order and discipline were compelling government 
interests, Justice Brennan noted that “if the danger of incitement 
necessitates prior clearance of servicemen’s messages, it would be 
logical for the military to mandate preclearance of all 
messages. . . .”149  Also, “[t]he only rational basis for disparate 
treatment of petitioning and oral communication would be the 
presence of some danger peculiar to the process of petitioning.”150  
Since no such danger existed, Justice Brennan concluded that the 
U.S.A.F. regulation should be found to violate servicemembers’ 
First Amendment rights.151 
3. Modern First Amendment Jurisprudence is Less Deferential 
in the Civilian Realm than in the Military 
Despite Justice Brennan’s pointed dissent, modern First 
Amendment military jurisprudence closely tracks the high level of 
deference given by the Glines majority.152  Modern civilian First 
Amendment cases are characterized by the “demand for content-
neutrality absent overriding justification, the presumption against 
prior restraints, and the requirement of enhanced clarity and 
specificity. . . .”153  In contrast, modern military First Amendment 
cases are characterized by such a high level of deference to 
military “judgments of necessity, efficiency, and appropriateness 
of means” that some commentators “question whether judicial 
review is even applicable.”154  More specifically, 
 
 147 Id. at 367 n.10. 
 148 See id. at 367. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 368 (emphasis in original). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is not Preferred: The Military 
and Other “Special Contexts,” 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1988). 
 153 Id. at 798–99. 
 154 Id. at 799. 
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there are . . . three major themes reflected in the deferential 
judicial posture adopted in the military cases.  First, there is 
an effort to denigrate competing [F]irst [A]mendment 
concerns.  Second, the courts invoke justiciability concerns, 
emphasizing the dominant constitutional roles of Congress 
and the Executive in controlling the military and the lack of 
judicial capabilities.  Third . . . the courts stress the unique 
and special needs of the military . . . 
as a separate community.155  Courts defer to the armed forces in 
First Amendment cases and give the military’s policies a high 
presumption of constitutionality.156  As discussed below, this 
deferential standard of review is inappropriate in the milblogging 
context, where strict scrutiny should be used to preserve the 
important interests milblogs serve and protect against viewpoint 
discrimination. 
III. PRESERVATION OF THE NATION VERSUS 
 PRESERVATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE BALANCE 
BETWEEN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY JUDGMENT AND  
PROTECTION OF SOLDIERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS SHOULD LIE 
Milblogging serves many important interests, including giving 
soldiers an outlet for their combat-related tension, serving as a 
check on unbridled military power, and informing Americans 
about events in Iraq not covered by the mainstream media.  To 
preserve these interests while ensuring the safety of our nation, 
courts should review the Department of Defense’s milblogging 
regulations using strict scrutiny.  Utilization of this test by courts 
will allow for legitimate national security concerns to pass 
constitutional muster while preventing cloaked viewpoint 
discrimination. 
 
 155 Id. at 815; see also supra notes 102–105, 114–117 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Dienes, supra note 152, at 815. 
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A. Milblogging Serves Important Interests 
Unlike low-value speech, such as obscenity,157 milbloggers’ 
speech serves important societal interests.  Milblogs serve as 
therapeutic devices for many soldiers, allowing them to express 
themselves freely and relieve the tensions of war, while also 
informing milblog readers about events in Iraq not covered by the 
mainstream media.158  In this way, milblogs also serve as a check 
on unbridled military power.159  Milblogs thus contain valuable 
speech that is deserving of strict scrutiny review by the courts. 
1. Milblogs Allow Soldiers to Relieve Their Tension 
Milblogs are an important therapeutic tool for soldiers because 
they allow soldiers to freely vent their frustrations within a highly 
bureaucratic organization.160  This may actually help to maintain 
order and discipline, allowing the military to act more 
cohesively.161  Although this premise may seem counterintuitive, 
given the American tendency towards free speech, it is “dangerous 
to prevent accumulated military discontent from being discharged 
through” milblogging.162  Moreover, “[i]f there is a lesson from 
Vietnam for military attorneys and commanders, it would be that 
mindless censorship often is the policy most disruptive of military 
discipline and morale.”163  Silencing dissent, then, is often more 
disruptive than allowing it, and will allow soldiers to express their 
frustrations in ways relatively harmless to the military.  Having 
vented their tensions, these soldiers can then coalesce as an 
effective fighting unit. 
 
 157 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (holding that theaters 
could be enjoined from showing obscene films). 
 158 Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 190 
(1957) (noting that “it seems dangerous to prevent accumulated military discontent from 
being discharged through the virtually harmless channels of griping to friends or writing 
letters to the editors of service or civilian papers or to families at home”). 
 159 Id. at 190. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 410; see also Zillman, supra note 103, at 
433 (noting that “free speech can provide better officers and enlisted men [while] 
suppression of speech can foster low morale and narrow thinking”). 
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In addition to being a way for soldiers to vent their frustrations, 
free speech also allows soldiers to achieve individual self-
fulfillment.164  Freedom of speech is “one of the individual’s most 
precious rights, a fundamental liberty rooted in our ethics, politics, 
and religion [that] . . . stands as an end it itself, deserving our 
defense against every encroachment not required by some 
competing interest critical to our survival.”165  Although national 
security interests may dictate some encroachment on service 
members’ right to free speech, “[a] person who enters the armed 
services remains an individual, a possessor of rights as well as a 
subject of duties, and his sacrifices of basic liberties should [thus] 
be kept to a minimum.”166  Strict scrutiny would allow censorship 
of information vital to national security interests while ensuring 
that millions of servicemen are not reduced to second-class citizens 
with fewer First Amendment rights than the civilian population.167 
2. Milblogs Inform Citizens and Serve as a Check on Military 
Power 
While there is some skepticism about whether there is a 
constitutional “right to know,”168 theorists and courts, alike, 
recognize that the First Amendment protections given to free 
speech and press serve as important checks on unbridled 
government power and inform the public about important issues.169  
Milblogs also accomplish these tasks and their soldier-authors’ 
words should thus be given the highest degree of First Amendment 
protection. 
Freedom of speech in the military context, like in the civilian 
realm, acts as a check on the unmitigated power of government.170  
Criticism of government in the civilian context is valued “for its 
 
 164 Zillman, supra note 103 (noting that “in the often confining circumstances of the 
military, freedom of expression is a reminder of individual uniqueness and worth”). 
 165 Vagts, supra note 158, at 190. 
 166 Id.; see also Zillman, supra note 103, at 433 (noting that “[f]reedom of expression 
can promote . . . ‘individual self-fulfillment’”). 
 167 Vagts, supra note 158, at 190. 
 168 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 169 See supra notes 69–70, 76–77, 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 170 See Zillman, supra note 103, at 431–433. 
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role in discouraging overreaching, arrogance and remoteness.”171  
Likewise, in the military context, “[u]nrestricted speech reveals 
information and encourages wise policies.”172  Free speech 
“provides necessary insight into the policymakers as well as the 
policy itself.”173  Suppression of free speech in the military would 
seal its members off from “potentially critical or unfavorable 
speech.”174  A military “isolated from political debate and the 
winds of change can become a repressive force, out of touch with 
the values and ideals of the civilian society.”175  A military that 
suppresses free speech could thus constitute “a serious danger to 
the American democratic and constitutional system.”176  By 
blogging about their experiences in Iraq, soldiers are merely 
holding the military’s Iraqi policies up to the light, allowing 
citizens to judge their wisdom.  Although milbloggers may not 
always portray the armed forces in a favorable light, it is crucial 
for Americans to receive more than a whitewashed view of the Iraq 
War.  Moreover, insights citizens gain from milblogs can help fuel 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”177 public debate about Iraq, 
which is essential to democracy. 
Beyond participation in the democratic system, Americans also 
should be informed about military policy because of its impact on 
every citizen’s safety.  The value of speech increases “with the 
significance of the issue discussed.”178  Therefore, “[t]he relevance 
of defense issues to each citizen’s physical security should 
encourage a substantial release of information.”179  Moreover, 
“[t]he value of speech also increases with the knowledge of the 
speaker.”180  As stated throughout this Note, milblogs written by 
soldiers fighting in the front lines of the Iraq War provide 
Americans thousands of miles away with invaluable insights into 
 
 171 Id. at 431. 
 172 Id. at 432. 
 173 Id. at 433. 
 174 Sherman, supra note 107, at 367 (1971). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
 178 Zillman, supra note 103, at 432. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
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the war.181  Milbloggers may portray the Iraq War differently than 
the mainstream media,182 but this divergence makes their writings 
even more valuable.183  Moreover, “[t]he military penchant for 
internal secrecy and its often remote overseas locations”184 make 
writings from front-line soldiers “even more valuable” to the 
public discourse.185  Milbloggers’ impressions of the war, 
anecdotes about their experiences in Iraq, and vivid portrayals of 
events only glossed over by the mainstream media thus all provide 
crucial information to both fuel the public discourse about the Iraq 
war and inform the citizenry about issues relevant to national 
security. 
B. Courts Should Evaluate the Department of Defense’s 
Milblogging Regulations Using Strict Scrutiny 
Despite the important interests discussed above,186 under 
current military jurisprudence, a court would scrutinize the 
Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations with more 
deference given to the military than is common under strict 
scrutiny.187  However, courts’ previous justification for applying a 
lesser degree of scrutiny to military laws restricting 
servicemembers’ First Amendment rights are unconvincing in the 
milblogging context.188  Moreover, the nature of the DOD’s 
milblogging regulations dictates that a court should either view 
them either as presumptively unconstitutional or through a lens of 
strict scrutiny. 
1. Milbloggers Are Not a Separate Community 
Courts generally defer to military judgment on speech issues 
because they view the military as a separate community, distinct 
 
 181 See supra Part I.A. 
 182 See supra note 23. 
 183 Cf. Zillman, supra note 103, at 432 (noting that while citizens “may not believe the 
dissenting expert, the fact that discussion exists may change [the] perspective on the 
matter in controversy”). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See supra Part III. 
 187 See supra Part II.B. 
 188 See infra Part III.B.3. 
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from the civilian world.189  The Glines majority’s conclusion that 
the “different character” of the military justifies lower First 
Amendment protections is an example of this type of thinking.190  
There are five characteristics of the military that set it apart from 
the civilian realm: 
First, the primary purpose of the military, fighting wars, is 
hard and dangerous.  Thousands of years of military history 
have not changed this basic fact.  Second, the work of the 
military, defending national interests or even the nation 
itself, is a vital national activity.  Third, despite rhetoric 
over the glory of the military, the great bulk of soldiers 
suffering casualties are from the lower social classes, 
generally poorly paid, and often lightly rewarded in 
prestige.  Fourth, the military is by nature an emergency 
force.  National affairs are in their most satisfactory state 
when the nation is at peace—when the military is not 
performing its distinctive function.  In peacetime, problems 
arise in maintaining employee preparedness and 
motivation.  Fifth, in many cases, the objective of battle or 
war is only dimly perceived or even actively opposed by 
the combat troops.  Sophisticated political, geographic, and 
economic theories are lost on the soldier concerned with 
personal survival.191 
Moreover, “the military fulfills a unique purpose and 
mission.”192  We entrust the military with “a vast array of weapons 
systems and technologies, capable of destroying not only towns 
and countries, but human civilization as we know it.”193  Courts 
thus hold that the military’s “awesome responsibilit[ies]” 
 
 189 See Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 397. 
 190 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
758 (1974)); see also Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 397 (noting that 
“[m]ilitary proponents . . . argue[] that the special nature of the Armed Forces as an 
organization devoted to national defense justifie[s] legal standards different from those 
normally applied to constitutional rights”). 
 191 See Zillman & Imwindelreid, supra note 112, at 402. 
 192 John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community Striking a Balance Between 
Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F.L. REV. 303, 345 (1998). 
 193 Id. 
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distinguish it from other civilian organizations where speech is 
protected more stringently.194 
However, the modern military is not really a separate 
community that justifies judicial deference to military self-
government.195 
The “society apart” was a valid description of the small, 
19th century, regular Army fighting Indians on the frontier.  
The description was still largely valid when forces stood 
garrison or shipboard duty in the 1930s.  But by 1974 the 
military had become a multimillion-person employer 
involved in almost every aspect of American life.196 
In addition to growing larger in size, the modern military has 
changed its recruitment tactics to emphasize the development of 
skills that can be carried over into the civilian realm.197  The 
modern military has become increasingly specialized and 
technology-based, meaning that “many servicemen pursue careers 
little different from and no more strenuous or dangerous than 
numerous civilian pursuits.”198  Data technicians, statisticians, JAG 
lawyers and army doctors are all examples of the increasingly-
common non-combat soldier.  The line between civilian and 
solider has blurred in the modern military, to the extent that a 
separate standard of review for military policies that abridge First 
Amendment rights is no longer justified. 
Milblogs, in particular, illustrate this blurring of the civilian 
and military realms.  In the Internet Age, it can hardly be argued 
that milbloggers are a separate community, set apart from their 
civilian readers.  On the contrary, milbloggers are part of a Web 
community consisting of both civilians and servicemen, and it is 
this interconnectedness that has military officials worried.  The 
Army claims operational security is at risk not because milblogs 
are seen only by servicemen, but because “anyone with access to 
the Internet can read many first-hand accounts of life in a war zone 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 See Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 400. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 403. 
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within seconds after they’re finished.”199  Milblogs are narrowing 
the “increasing distance between the civilian and military worlds, 
and the divergence in values of both.”200  Instead of being part of a 
separate community, then, milblogs are merging two communities 
together.  To be sure, the military still has unique security and 
disciplinary needs that set it apart from many other organizations.  
However, the experience of “para-military forces, such as police 
and fire departments,” indicates that servicemembers can be given 
First Amendment rights while still performing their duties with a 
high degree of loyalty and discipline.201  The Supreme Court’s 
traditional deference to military censorship authority based on the 
separateness of the armed forces is thus inapplicable in the 
milblogging context. 
2. The Department of Defense’s Milblogging Regulations are 
a De Facto Prior Restraint and Should Thus Be 
Presumptively Unconstitutional 
Because of their potential chilling effect on soldiers’ speech, 
the Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations are a de facto 
prior restraint and should thus be viewed as presumptively 
unconstitutional.  De facto prior restraints are notoriously hard to 
define,202 but are essentially regulations that have the same 
censoring effect as an injunction or a licensing scheme.203  De 
facto prior restraints are distinct from regulations mandating a 
subsequent punishment for unlawful activity.204  However, “in 
some instances the operation and effect of a particular enforcement 
scheme, though not in the form of a traditional prior restraint, 
may . . . raise the same concerns which inform all of [the Supreme 
 
 199 Mark Memmott, ‘Milbloggers’ Are Typing Their Place in History, USA TODAY, 
May 12, 2005, available at http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2005/05/12/ 
milbloggers_are_typing_their_place_in_history.html. 
 200 Hugh Hewitt, supra note 10. 
 201 Sherman, supra note 107, at 367 (1971). 
 202 See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 96–97 (discussing the ambiguity between de 
facto prior restraints and subsequent punishment). 
 203 Id. at 96. 
 204 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s forfeiture of obscene materials under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) was a subsequent punishment, not a prior restraint on his First 
Amendment rights). 
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Court’s] prior restraint cases: the evils of state censorship and the 
unacceptable chilling of protected speech.”205 
The Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations contain 
several elements that will potentially chill speech.  The 
requirement that milbloggers and website hosts register their blogs 
with unit commanders206 has the chilling effect of removing the 
Internet’s anonymity.  Milbloggers now know that their unit, 
location, webmaster name, telephone number and IP address of 
their blog or website are all on file with their commanders.207  
Moreover, milbloggers know that these commanders will be 
reading and monitoring their blogs for possible operational security 
breaches.208  Their lack of anonymity combined with the 
knowledge that their commanders may be reading every post will 
surely cause most milbloggers to think twice about posting things 
critical of the war or of their units.  Moreover, the knowledge that 
under this policy other soldiers have been punished for blogs 
critical of the Iraq War209 might cause many milbloggers to change 
the tone of their writing to advocate a more pro-Iraq view.  As one 
commentator has noted, “[t]he necessity of submitting to 
censorship will of itself deter many prospective authors from 
publishing their views,”210 especially given the fact that “[c]ensors 
are apt to be hyper-cautious, particularly at lower military 
echelons.”211  Moreover, “[t]he delays occurring ‘while the censor 
ponders moodily on “policy and propriety”‘ may serve to nullify 
the impact of a communication because the public’s interest in 
military matters is particularly evanescent.”212  The appeal of 
milblogs is largely based on the ability to read real-time accounts 
of the fighting in Iraq, so without up-to-date postings, the 
uniqueness of the genre is lost.  While the enforcement of the 
 
 205 Id. at 572 (Kennedy, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
 206 Kennedy, supra note 39, at 31; see also Finer, supra note 13 (noting that this policy, 
promulgated by Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, the top tactical commander in Iraq, was “the 
military’s first policy memorandum on Web sites maintained by soldiers”). 
 207 Vines’ Memorandum, supra note 27. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See infra Part IV.B.3.b. 
 210 Vagts, supra note 158, at 213. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
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Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations could be 
characterized as a subsequent punishment, the burdens posed by 
these regulations are a de facto prior restraint because they 
unacceptably chill protected speech.  The registration requirement 
and loss of anonymity make it more than likely that potential 
milbloggers will conclude that posting their experiences in an 
online diary is simply not worth the hassle and risk.  Countless 
viewpoints of the Iraq War will thus be lost, as will civilians’ 
ability to vicariously experience the Iraq war via milblogs. 
3. Courts Should Apply Strict Scrutiny to the Department of 
Defense’s Milblogging Regulations 
Even if the Department of Defense’s milblogging regulations 
are not an unconstitutional prior restraint, courts still should not 
defer to military censorship authority.  Instead, courts should 
utilize strict scrutiny to ensure that servicemembers’ First 
Amendment rights are being protected to the greatest extent 
possible.  While it is true that “[a] sad paradox requires that the 
serviceman sacrifice some of the liberties which he is called upon 
to protect,”213 it is the job of the courts to police the Constitution.  
“[I]f judicial review is to constitute a meaningful restraint upon 
unwarranted encroachments upon freedom in the name of military 
necessity, situations in which the judiciary refrains from examining 
the merit of the claim of necessity must be kept to an absolute 
minimum.”214  One only need look at Korematsu v. United 
States215 to be reminded that high deference to military judgment 
in the interest of national security can allow atrocities to take place.  
Certainly, “[m]ilitary (or national) security is a weighty 
interest . . . .”216  However, “the concept of military necessity is 
seductively broad, and has a dangerous plasticity”217 that can be 
invoked to “justify an encroachment upon civil liberties.”218  
 
 213 Id. at 189. 
 214 Warren, supra note 1, at 193. 
 215 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (deferring to the military’s judgment that it was necessary, for 
national security reasons, to exclude thousands of Japanese-American citizens from 
certain areas of the West Coast following the Pearl Harbor bombing). 
 216 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
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Therefore, “the military-security argument must be approached 
with a healthy skepticism: its very gravity counsels that courts be 
cautious when military necessity is invoked by the Government to 
justify a trespass on First Amendment rights.”219  True national 
security concerns will survive strict scrutiny, as discussed below, 
while cloaked viewpoint discrimination will not.  In this way, strict 
scrutiny will ensure that milbloggers’ First Amendment rights are 
being stringently protected while still allowing the military to 
guard against the release of information dangerous to operational 
security. 
a) The Lessons of the Pentagon Papers and The 
Progressive: True National Security Concerns Will 
Withstand Strict Scrutiny 
True national security concerns will survive a strict scrutiny 
review of the Department of Defense regulation abridging 
milbloggers’ First Amendment rights.  While the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled in favor of publication in New York Times Co. v. 
United States,220 it did so by noting that the government had not 
met its heavy burden of showing a valid national security concern 
that would justify enjoining publication of the Pentagon Papers.221  
The government had not shown that publication of the Pentagon 
Papers would obstruct military recruiting, disclose the sailing dates 
of military transports, or disclose the number and location of 
troops.222  The New York Times Court thus implied that a valid 
national security concern would overcome the presumption against 
prior restraints.223  It follows, then, that valid national security 
concerns would also be enough to survive the slightly less rigorous 
strict scrutiny analysis. 
 
 219 Id. 
 220 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 221 Id. at 714 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) and 
noting that there is a presumption of unconstitutionality regarding prior restraints). 
 222 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that a 
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of 
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”). 
 223 See 403 U.S. 713. 
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The national security concerns cited by military officials when 
justifying the blogging regulations are very similar to those cited in 
United States v. Progressive, Inc.224  There, the government argued 
that publication of an article about hydrogen bombs was a threat to 
national security because, even though most of the article’s 
information was in the public domain, publication of that 
information in an easily-accessible format could “help enemies 
who otherwise would not put all the pieces together.”225  Similarly, 
in regards to milblogs, the military claims that “revealing a minor 
aspect of strategy or tactics may seem insignificant . . . but [i]f the 
bad guys take a piece from me, and a piece from you, and a piece 
from another guy, pretty soon they can gather some pretty good 
intel[ligence].”226  The Progressive court ruled in favor of 
censorship, noting that publication of the hydrogen bomb article 
was “analogous to publication of troop movements or locations in 
time of war and falls within the extremely narrow exception to the 
rule against prior restraint.”227  If the Department of Defense could 
show a valid national security concern stemming from terrorists’ 
piecemeal assembly of data gleaned from milblogs, this would 
arguably be a valid enough national security concern to survive a 
strict scrutiny analysis of its milblogging regulations.228 
In addition to concerns about information compiled by 
terrorists, the military may also be able to show a valid national 
security concern by arguing that censorship of milblogs is 
necessary to maintain friendly foreign relations in a time of 
growing anti-American sentiment.  Soldiers’ words may endanger 
relations with foreign allies, especially if an individual 
servicemember’s words are mistaken for official military policy.229  
In the era of a global war on terror “there is . . . a very real danger 
that blustering speeches might upset the often delicate relationships 
 
 224 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also supra notes 81–87 and accompanying 
text. 
 225 FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 101; see also supra notes 81–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 226 Mallia, supra note 49 (quoting Marine Capt. Don Caetano). 
 227 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996; see also supra notes 81–87 and accompanying 
text. 
 228 See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 731–41 (White, J., concurring). 
 229 Vagts, supra note 158, at 189. 
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between [the United States] and our allies and antagonists.”230  
This is especially true of speeches made by troops stationed 
overseas because “[t]he presence of foreign troops in a country 
inevitably grates on local sensitivities.”231  Troops “protesting 
policies of [their] own government may incidentally be challenging 
those of the host country as well[,]”232 and when servicemen 
“inject themselves into the domestic politics, the local citizens’ 
displeasure can turn into outrage.”233  Moreover, “[f]oreign citizens 
unfamiliar with American traditions may resent the protest or 
confuse the individual serviceman’s views with those of the United 
States.”234  Speech by troops stationed in foreign countries, left 
uncensored, could thus create an international conflict or fan the 
flames of an already-volatile foreign occupation.  Avoiding such a 
conflagration may, therefore, be justification enough for the 
Department of Defense’s milblogging policies under strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
i. Maintaining the Military’s Functionality 
In addition to concerns about compilation of data by terrorists 
and maintenance of foreign relations, in a time of war the military 
may also have a compelling interest in restricting speech so that 
the hierarchical structure and discipline of the military is 
preserved.  The military’s pyramidal hierarchy starts with low-
level “privates, seamen, and airmen bound to respect their 
noncommissioned officers” and “culminates in generals and 
admirals bound to respect civilian secretaries and the President.”235  
Traditionally, “significant military decisions are made by [the] 
civilian political leaders, not [lower-level] military personnel.”236  
The civilian political leaders thus bear the ultimate responsibility 
for military decisions.  “Extra restraints on speech in the armed 
 
 230 Id. 
 231 Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 406. 
 232 Id. at 409. 
 233 Id. at 406. 
 234 Id. at 409; see also Vagts, supra note 158, at 189 (“For many listeners an officer’s 
words have a peculiar aura of responsibility and officiality.  Many find it hard to believe 
the standard disclaimer that a general or admiral is speaking only for himself and ‘not 
necessarily’ for the service as a whole.”). 
 235 Vagts, supra note 158, at 188. 
 236 Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 406. 
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services are ultimately rooted in the need for a rigid and 
thoroughgoing attitude of subordination”237 towards these leaders, 
who “need protection from irresponsible abuse[.]”238  Additionally, 
commanders should be able to rely on the “silent support, if not 
enthusiasm,” of their subordinates.239  Beyond a need for loyal 
troops, there is also a fear that “[a]ny expression of disagreement 
[with military policy] by servicemen might move the military into 
politics, or prompt a military coup.”240 
Milblogs, however, allow dissent to be expressed and 
disseminated easily.  While it seems unlikely that a milblogger’s 
words will prompt a military coup, they could undermine the 
discipline of other soldiers.  We entrust the military with “a vast 
array of weapons systems and technologies, capable of destroying 
not only towns and countries, but human civilization as we know 
it.”241  Because of these onerous responsibilities, it is crucial to 
maintain support and discipline within the armed forces.  General 
H. Norman Schwarzkopf explained before Congress “that in [his] 
forty years of Army service in three different wars, [he is] 
convinced that soldier cohesion is the single most important factor 
in a unit’s ability to succeed on the battlefield.”242  Moreover, 
while serving as Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General 
Colin Powell argued that: 
We create cohesive teams of warriors who will bond so 
tightly that they are prepared to go into battle and give their 
lives if necessary for the accomplishment of the mission 
and for the cohesion of the group and for their individual 
 
 237 Vagts, supra note 158, at 188. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 406; see also United States v. Priest, 21 
C.M.A. 564, 571 (1972) (noting that one possible harm of the underground newsletter 
published by the defendant “is the effect on others if the impression becomes widespread 
that revolution, smashing the state, murdering policemen, and assassination of public 
officials are acceptable conduct”).  But see Sherman, supra note 107, at 344–45 (1971) 
(noting that throughout the twentieth century generals have been involved in politics 
while still on active duty, and citing the battle between Generals Eisenhower and 
MacArthur for the 1952 Republican Presidential nomination as a prominent example of 
politicking while still on active duty). 
 241 John A. Carr, supra note 192, at 345. 
 242 Id. at 347. 
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buddies.  We cannot allow anything to happen which would 
disrupt that feeling of cohesion within the force.243 
Certain types of free speech “may subtly undermine the 
loyalty, discipline, and morale of servicemen.”244  Moreover, 
“[f]irst amendment activity questioning military and national 
policies may lead to violence and a loss of disciplinary control” 
because “[s]ervicemen trained in physical response are often eager 
to relieve tensions and are frequently intolerant of ‘different’ 
viewpoints.”245  The Department of Defense may thus be able to 
show it has a compelling interest in maintaining soldiers’ 
discipline, and their respect for superior officers.  In addition to 
national security concerns, these arguments may also be enough to 
allow the milblogging regulations to survive strict scrutiny. 
b) Strict Scrutiny is Needed to Protect against Viewpoint 
Discrimination 
The justifications for the Department of Defense’s milblogging 
policy certainly seem compelling: the need to guard against 
terrorists’ compilation of information dangerous to America, and 
the need to maintain the military’s functionality.  Arguably then, a 
content-neutral milblogging policy would withstand strict scrutiny.  
However, while the Department of Defense’s milblogging policy is 
content-neutral on its face, there is evidence that it is being used as 
a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.246  The question thus 
remains as to whether the DOD’s compelling interests are enough 
justify viewpoint discrimination.247 
 
 243 Id. at 347 n.283. 
 244 Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 405. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fifty-Fifth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: The First 
Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 199, 213 (1994). 
[E]ven viewpoint restrictions will be allowed if there is a sufficiently 
compelling government interest.  For example, a school system likely would 
have a compelling interest in choosing not to spend scarce library dollars for 
racist propaganda.  There, of course, is no formula for deciding what is a 
compelling interest; but that is a problem throughout constitutional law . . . . 
Id. 
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Under the current Department of Defense policy, unit 
commanders in Iraq are given the burden of ensuring milbloggers’ 
compliance with regulations.248  This means that “many 
commanders may abuse [their authority to balance First 
Amendment expression values] and continue to overreact to 
servicemen’s expression of unpopular views.”249  There is 
evidence of this type of viewpoint discrimination occurring in Iraq, 
where authors of blogs critical of the war are censored while pro-
Iraq blogs remain untouched.  For example, Leonard Clark’s blog 
contained descriptions of his company’s captain as a “glory 
seeker,” characterized his battalion sergeant as an “inhuman 
monster,” and suggested that “his fellow soldiers were becoming 
opposed to the U.S. mission in Iraq.”250  Clark’s punishment, 
discussed above, constituted “every possible punishment” 
available for violating OpSec in his politically-liberal blog.251  
Jason Hartley’s blog was also written in a notoriously sarcastic and 
critical style.252  In his blog, Hartley wrote accounts of the frat-boy 
like antics of his fellow soldiers, described his unit’s missions in a 
sarcastic manner, and characterized his time in Iraq as “a constant 
state of suck.”253  While the Army contends that these postings 
violated OpSec,254 Hartley feels that “the Army’s real concern was 
his satiric tone.”255  Hartley contends that “[the blogs] that stay up 
are completely patriotic and innocuous, and they’re fine if you 
want to read the flag-waving and how everything’s peachy keen in 
Iraq[.]”256  At least one commentator agrees with this assertion that 
military officials are trying to muffle dissent from troops in the 
 
 248 See Vines’ Memorandum, supra note 27. 
 249 Zillman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 112, at 409. 
 250 Finer, supra note 13 (quoting an entry where Clark wrote that “[a] growing number 
of men [stationed in Iraq] are starting to wonder why we should continue to risk our lives 
for this whole mess when we know that the government will probably pull out of here”). 
 251 Thomas Claburn, Army Chief of Staff Calls For More Oversight of Military 
Bloggers, INFO. WEEK, Sept. 1, 2005, available at http://informationweek.com/story/ 
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=170102708. 
 252 John Hockenberry, supra note 11. 
 253 Id. 
 254 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 255 Mallia, supra note 49. 
 256 Id. 
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field.257  Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings 
Institution in Washington, has commented that censorship of 
milblogs “has much less to do with operational security and 
classified secrets and more to do with American politics and how 
the war is seen by a public that is getting increasingly shaky about 
the overall venture[.]”258  This assertion is also supported by 
memoranda from top military officials cautioning against posting 
information that would negatively affect the public’s perception of 
the war.259 
This evidence of viewpoint discrimination is problematic 
because while the Department of Defense may have legitimate 
security concerns, those concerns do not justify their political 
control of information about the Iraq war.  If Hartley and Clark’s 
blogs did contain information that could be used by the enemy, 
then their punishments are justified.  However, if Hartley’s 
assertion is correct that the military shut down his blog because he 
portrayed the war in a negative light, then this is something that 
must be dealt with by the courts.  Under Glines,260 soldiers like 
Hartley who claim viewpoint discrimination still have a cause of 
action for violation of their First Amendment rights.  These 
soldiers can assert that commanders applied the Department of 
Defense’s milblogging regulation “irrationally, invidiously, or 
arbitrarily.”261  However, the Supreme Court should also use strict 
scrutiny to conduct a substantive review of the military’s decision 
to censor milbloggers, to ensure that the underlying security 
concerns cited by the government are legitimate, and not merely a 
pretext for the Department of Defense to gain public relations 
control of the Iraq war.  In this way, the Court can ensure that 
national security is maintained while the rights guaranteed to 
servicemen by the Constitution are also preserved.262 
 
 257 Eric Magnell, Soldiers’ Blogs to Face Military Scrutiny, Aug. 24, 2004, available at 
http:/www.npr.org.templates/story/story.php?storyId=3867981. 
 258 Id. 
 259 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 260 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 351 (1980). 
 261 Id. at 358 n.15. 
 262 See Warren, supra note 1, at 200. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Milblogs have created new operational security risks for the 
military, and as the Department of Defense struggles to deal with 
these risks, it is up to the courts to police their actions to ensure 
servicemembers’ First Amendment rights are being protected.  
Milblogs serve important societal interests: they are both a 
therapeutic tool that let soldiers write about the trauma of combat 
and a democratic tool that let Americans thousands of miles away 
have a bird’s-eye, hopefully uncensored, view of the Iraq War.  
Milbloggers are thus contributing to the political dialogue by 
allowing anyone with an Internet connection to read about their 
experiences in Iraq.  Because anyone can access milblogs, the 
Court’s deference to the military as a separate community is 
inapplicable here.  Instead, the Court should view the Department 
of Defense’s milblogging regulation as a prior restraint or, 
alternatively, view it through the lens of strict scrutiny.  Either of 
these standards of review will allow true national security concerns 
to pass constitutional muster while invalidating any pretextual 
viewpoint discrimination.  Given the military’s attempts to gain 
public relations control of the Iraq War, strict scrutiny is necessary 
to ensure that servicemembers are not unjustly being denied the 
very rights they are fighting to protect.  To answer Former Chief 
Justice Warren’s question,263 it is possible to preserve the Nation 
and the Constitution at the same time, and in the milblogging 
context it is up to the Court to strike this balance. 
 
 263 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
